One
cannot begin to understand the impact of the bankruptcy automatic stay until its lineage is
understood.
It
was once joked that Marilyn Monroe told Albert Einstein that they should have a
child together. She purportedly asked Einstein, “Can you just imagine a child with
my looks and your brain”? “Yes”, said Einstein, “but what if the child had my
looks and your brain”? As with Congress birthing any law, you are never quite
sure what you are going to get. Once the biology of the law is set in motion,
however, there is little that can be done about it, despite what some judges
might like to do to defeat Congressional intent. From the debtors’ standpoint, Congress
birthed a beautiful child of high intellect when it passed 11 U.S.C. § 362.
From the creditors’ perspective, Congress delivered a Frankenstein. As they say in East Texas, if you want to know what
a child is going to look like just look at the child’s parents. To fully
appreciate 11 U.S.C. § 362, you have to understand its parentage. This is
supported by the United States Supreme Court who stated in Morissette v.
United States, 71 S.Ct. 240, 250 (1952), “where Congress borrows terms of
art in which are accumulated the legal traditions and meanings of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it has taken
and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.” The tendency in automatic stay litigation is to focus too narrowly
on bankruptcy court decisions, when in fact there are volumes of related
published Supreme Court and circuit court opinions that define the sum and
substance of the automatic stay and the litigation that derives from its
violation. Automatic stay litigation is
born of two parents. The beautiful
mother is federal injunction law. The smart father is federal fee-shifting
laws, or what is commonly called “private attorneys general” statutes. The legal heritage of both of these parents
directly relates to automatic stay litigation. The case law should be fully
utilized.
The
beautiful mother is the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) that
constitutes, essentially, a codification of federal law concerning injunctions.
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals explains it well:
“We
have characterized the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) as ‘essentially a
court ordered injunction, [and] any person or entity who violates the stay may
be found in contempt of court.’…Although essentially a court-ordered injunction,
the automatic stay nevertheless is actually a legislative creation with unique
properties different from court ordered injunctions. As its common name
suggests, the ‘automatic stay’ arises automatically when a petition is filed,
unless falling within an exception under § 362(b). In contrast, a court-ordered injunction is
discretionary, not automatic, and usually does not arise until after a
complainant files a separate motion. The metes and bounds of the automatic stay
are provided by statute and systematically applied to all cases. However, the metes and bounds of court
ordered injunctions are provided on a case-by-case basis by the issuing court
specifically tailoring the injunction to fit the specific circumstances of the
specific case…The nature of court-ordered injunctions requires the enforcing
court not only to determine whether the order was valid, but to make case
specific determinations whether ‘1) the allegedly violated order was valid and
lawful; 2) the order was clear, definite
and unambiguous; and 3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the
order’…In contrast, determinations (1) whether the automatic stay is valid and
lawful and (2) whether the automatic stay is clear, definite and unambiguous do
not vary on a case-by-case basis.” (Internal cites omitted). Jove
Engineering, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996).
The
stern and intellectual father of automatic stay litigation is the federal
private attorneys general statute of 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(or § 362(h) under the
old Code), which essentially says “do what your mother tells you to do, or
else”!
I
am a child of the Cold War and I remember Nikita Khrushchev saying, “If you
feed the people just with revolutionary slogans they will listen today, they
will listen tomorrow, they will listen the day after tomorrow, but on the
fourth day they will say, ‘To hell with you.’” It does not matter which side of
the divide you are on, we all know that rights are not self-enforcing. That is to say that the protections allowed
the debtor in § 362(a) are nice, they are inspiring, but they are just slogans.
The government does not know when a debtor’s rights are being violated. It does
not have the infrastructure to pursue the perpetrators when it is informed.
That is the reason for the addition of §362(k). As with all fee-shifting
statutes, it places the debtor, and his or her attorney, in the position of
private attorneys general authorized to identify stay violations and prosecute
those that commit the wrong. We know
this because the standards the Court sets out for the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Award Act “are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has
authorized an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.” Hensley v.
Echerhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983). To this we add the authority of the
circuit courts. Congress has “created a system of ‘private attorneys general’
who will be able to aid the effective enforcement of the [Code].” Gram v. Bank of Louisiana, 691 F.2d 728, 729 (5th
Cir. 1982) (TILA). The intent is to
allow the consumer to participate in policing the enforcement of the automatic
stay, and its language should be construed liberally in light of its broad
remedial purpose. See, Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d
740,748 (5th Cir. 1993) (TILA). The award of consumer attorney fees is critical
to the effective enforcement of fee-shifting statutes by encouraging consumers
to act as private attorneys general, where available actual and statutory
damages would not otherwise justify an action. Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409 (7th Cir.
1998) (Civil Rights). Plant v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 589 F.2d 1357
(5th Cir. 1979 (TILA). McGowan v. King, Inc. 569 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1978)
(TILA). Private enforcement obviates the need for a large federal enforcement
bureaucracy. In re Steingbrecher, 110 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990)
(TILA).
If
you have ever watched any of the “Kids Say The Darndest Things” shows, you know
it is true. “Don’t trust a dog to watch
your food”. “Never hold a cat and a dust buster at the same time”. “Felt
markers aren’t good to use as lipstick”. “When your Dad asks you, ‘Do I look
stupid’ don’t answer him”. And, “When you get a bad grade at school, show it to
your Mom when she’s on the phone”. Like
any kid, 11 U.S.C. §362, says the darndest things as well. These darndest things will be the subject of
future posts.
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